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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of the US and China’s foreign aids to Africa on trade 
flows between donor and recipient countries. Evidence from the gravity model estimates 
reveals that the two donors’ exports are strengthened by their aids to African partners. 
Interestingly, China’s aid shows a positive effect on its total volume of trade and imports 
from Africa, while the aid from the US exhibits little impact on the US-Africa total trade 
and its imports from Africa. A possible explanation for such a difference could be due to 
the dissimilar national interests of donors in Africa. This study finally suggests that 
African countries should accelerate the pace of advancing domestic economies and rely 
less on foreign assistance, in order to establish a fairer and more equal international 
economic order. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on aid-trade relationship shows that foreign aid promotes bilateral trade flows between 
donor and recipient countries, with effects vary over time but also depending on the national interests 
of the donor (Chenery and Strout, 1966; Nowak-Lehmann D et al., 2009; Osei et al., 2004; Pettersson 
and Johansson, 2013). Continuous inflow of foreign aid improves the donor-recipient bilateral 
economic relationship that may help accelerate trade flows between the two sides. However, there are 
still many underlying factors that account for such kind of effect. One would like to explore further if 
foreign aid boosts the overall trade or there are different impact on the donor-recipient’s inflow and 
outflow of goods and services. The objective of this paper is therefore to investigate the impact of 
foreign aid on different trade flows between donor and recipient countries.  
Since the Official Development Assistance (ODA) was coined by the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1969, 
African countries have received a large share of the total ODA disbursement owing to their 
persistently disappointing economic performance. As the largest donor in the global aid market, the 
US aid policy in Africa is well known for its conditionality1 and selectivity (Burnside and Dollar, 
2000). By contrast, China, the largest emerging competitor to traditional donors, always offers 
unconditional aid to African partners and pursues mutual benefits based on the framework of South-
South cooperation. The US aid to Africa increased by appropriately four folds in the past two decades, 
see Figure 1. The cumulative Chinese foreign aid to Africa reached 130 billion USD during 2000-
2013. 2  But there are criticisms about China’s unconditional aid to Africa, which is seen as the 
resistance to the Western countries’ work on the improvement of governance and democracy in Africa. 
Moreover, China is often accused of despoiling natural resources from Africa for its growing influence 
in Africa. In the context of an ever-increasing China’s presence in Africa, the US-China contest in the 
African continent is becoming increasingly intense. On such an occasion, this paper is therefore 
interested in the impact of the US and China’s aid to Africa on different bilateral trade flows between 
US/China and African countries.   
In the existing literature, the gravity model has been a popular paradigm for measuring the impact of 
foreign aid on trade, since the gravity framework and theoretical foundations of this model can 
incorporate any time invariant factors that may affect trade, i.e., distance, freedom of trade and 
governance indicators (Anderson, 1979; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Bergstrand, 1985). This 
                                                     
1 Conditionality means that aid is only given following conditions which have to be met by the recipient country, 
i.e. good governance and democracy. 
2 The cumulative Chinese aid to Africa data is calculated by the author according to the 1.2 version of AidData’s 
Chinese Official Finance to Africa dataset which tracks 2,648 development finance activities in Africa from 
2000 to 2013. Chinese Official Finance to Africa dataset is collected from the AidData. 
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general proposed specification is more adequate as it provides a rationale for any unobserved (time 
invariant) bilateral effect (Carrere, 2006). Therefore, all factors that affect bilateral trade which are 
captured by unobserved constant individual effects can be controlled. 
Figure 1: US and China Aid to Africa 
          
Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System and AidData's Chinese Official Finance to Africa Dataset 
In this paper, following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and 
many others, we apply the gravity model to explore the impact of US and China’s aids to Africa on 
different bilateral trade flows between donor and recipient countries, including the effects of aid on 
bilateral total trade, donors’ exports  to and imports from recipients. Our sample includes two donors 
(US and China) and 26/30 recipient countries (26 for the US sample and 30 for China sample) 
covering the period 2003-2012. With regard to the econometric method, we first adopt a pooled OLS 
to investigate the aid-trade relationship, then we apply the fixed and random effects model to control 
for unobserved individual heterogeneity that is constant over time. Concerning the lagged effect of 
bilateral trade data, we finally use the first-differenced GMM specification to estimate the gravity 
model.  
The main finding of this study is that the Chinese aid shows a positive impact on the China-Africa 
bilateral trade, but the US aid does not exhibit any influence on the bilateral trade between the US and 
African countries. When examining the effects of foreign aid on donor’s exports to recipients, both the 
US and China’s aids present a positive impact on their exports to African economies. This could be 
explained by the fact that recipient nations import more products from the donor for returning the 
favor or the donor provides tied aid3 to the recipient. Interestingly, a positive effect on China’s imports 
from African partners is found resulting from China’s aid, while the US aid does not show any impact 
on the US imports from Africa. This further implies that only when official aid programs are 
established on the premise of mutual benefit can a positive impact on the donor-recipient trade 
relationship be expected.  
                                                     
3 Tied aid means that foreign aid is often tied to the donor country exports or linked to the achievement of 
specific foreign policy objectives. 
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The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant literature on 
China’s foreign aid and the impact of aid on trade. General background of the US and China aid to 
Africa and the donor-recipient trade relations are given in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the theoretical 
model and econometric methods. Section 5 describes the data. Empirical results and discussions are 
detailed in Section 6 and the last section concludes.   
2. Relevant Literature  
2.1 US and China’s Foreign Aids 
2.1.1 US Foreign Aid 
The US has made efforts to offer foreign aid to the rest world more than a half century, as it is viewed 
as a key tool of US foreign policy (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2009). Foreign aid comes in the form of 
either bilateral or multilateral (Gunatilake et al., 2011). Currently, the US aid is mainly bilateral, i.e. 
the US provides aids to a specific recipient country (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2009). The US aid is 
primarily conducted by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), with non-
government organizations (NGO) acting as the primary partners alongside. Since the foundation in the 
1980s, NGO channel has played a significant role in delivering the Western aid (Opoku-Mensah, 
2009). Regarding the sectoral focus, the key focus of the US aid in Africa is the social sector, like the 
education and health sectors (Wang and Ozanne, 2010; Amusa et al., 2016). 
Foreign aid has been acting as a significant role in improving the global economic environment, which 
eventually promotes the US exports and its global power. The empirical studies of Nowak-Lehmann et 
al. (2013) and Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2014) reveal that the US exports to developing countries are 
positively associated with its bilateral aid. However, the exports of recipient countries are not 
promoted by the aid (Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2013). With respect to the behavior of different donors, 
there are some comparative works on the aid allocation of US and other donors (Alesina and Dollar, 
2000). Harrigan and Wang (2011) compared the aid allocation of US with the other major donors and 
found that the US attaches more importance on its national interests than the others do. With a 
comparative approach, Amusa et al. (2016) empirically studied the aid allocation of US and China to 
Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA). The findings indicate that, (1) both the recipient needs and donor interests 
are important factors in determining the US and China’s aid allocation; (2) China provides aid to the 
region for the sake of nature resource, while the US pays more attention to its global power. 
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2.1.2 China’s Foreign Aid 
Researchers are increasingly shifting their interests into China’s foreign aid with China’s ever-
increasing presence in Africa. While it comes to the Chinese aid, it is mainly bilateral (Opoku-Mensah, 
2009; Lengauer, 2011), and its aid to Africa is no exception either (Lum, et al., 2008). Unlike the US 
aid, the Chinese aid does not rely on the NGO channel (Opoku-Mensah, 2009), it is primarily provided 
by the government or relied on the official channel. Considering the sectoral focus, Chinese aid 
focuses on infrastructure, innovation, exports and health (Amusa et al., 2016). Gharib (2013) found 
that more than 70% of Chinese aid is geared towards infrastructure construction. Over 30% of the total 
value of infrastructure projects in Africa is supported by the Chinese aid, which outweighs the 
Western donors. China’s aid to Africa is not used as a political tool in the same way as that of Western 
donors, but more commercial and win-win cooperation (Sautman, 2005).  
Tied aid is one of the characteristics of Chinese aid in Africa (Wang and Ozanne, 2010) and a  tool 
used by China to reach its specific economic and political goals, especially in the African continent 
(Pehnelt, 2007). To examine the claim that China’s aid is characterized by ―rogue aid‖ that guided by 
selfish interests alone, Dreher and Fuchs (2015) empirically tested to what extent self-interests shape 
China’s aid allocation, based on the data on Chinese project aid, food aid, medical staff and total aid 
money to developing countries from 1956 to 2006. The evidence suggested that China’s aid allocation 
does not depend on recipients’ endowment with natural resources. Therefore, it is unjustified to 
condemn China’s aid as ―rogue aid‖. This is also supported by Brautigam (2009).  
Africa, as the main recipient of China’s aid, has drawn massive attention from academics probably due 
to its strategic importance for the balance of global powers. Chinese aid to Africa is the guarantee of 
mineral resources and potential markets for trade and investment (Brookes and Shin, 2006; Ajakaiye, 
2006; Taylor, 2009). However, Ajakaiye (2006) found that the majority of Chinese aid is used to 
rehabilitate infrastructure and development new ones, such as hospitals, school buildings and sports 
stadiums. Aid without policy conditionality is considered as a major advantage of China’s aid in 
Africa, while there are still many challenges, for instance, Chinese workers and suppliers implied in 
the aid, and infrastructures are not genuinely designed to support local production related activities 
like the African Union Headquarters. Kobayashi (2008) argued that China’s aid without conditionality 
but being tied is to assist Chinese firms to expand their operations overseas. China’s aid to Africa, in 
the form of ―barter‖ with recipients’ natural resources, is an efficient instrument that benefits both the 
donor (China) and the recipients (African countries). Babaci-Wilhite et al. (2013) discussed the 
attributes of good aid architecture in relation to the peculiarities of Africa’s challenges. They 
suggested that the Beijing Consensus, with the principles of multidimensional, intrinsic and non-
economic roles of development aid, is more generous and more attractive for sustainable development 
in Africa. In terms of the failure of the aid to Africa from traditional donors, Moyo (2009) attributed it 
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to the conditionality that is incompatible with the local community. In contrast, as the indispensible 
trade partner of Africa, China’s aid benefits the two parties. In spite of this, the ―Chinese-style 
development-assistance model‖ is still subjected to criticism from the West (Kobayashi, 2008). More 
recent evidence shows that African economies receiving additional aid flows from China enhance their 
fiscal response to aid through an increased local economy aid absorption rate (Kilama, 2016).  
2.2 Impact of Aid on Bilateral Trade Flows 
2.2.1 Transfer Paradox 
There has been an extensive literature on the impact of foreign aid on trade flows. Early discussions on 
the aid-trade relationship can be dated back to the transfer paradox, which states that foreign aid can 
be donor-enriching and recipient-immiserizing due to terms-of-trade effects associated with aid flows 
(Martínez‐Zarzoso et al., 2014). As an income transfer, foreign aid affects the welfare of both the 
donor and the recipient countries. Brecher and Bhagwati (1981) conducted the transfer problem 
analysis in a 3-country model by distinguishing national income from aggregate income. They found 
that national welfare might deteriorate even when international commodity-market is stable. Brecher 
and Bhagwati (1982) and Bhagwati et al. (1983) extended the theoretical presumption of the transfer 
paradox with more general settings. Kemp and Kojima (1985) attributed the donor-enrichment and 
recipient-impoverishment to the endogenous price distortion. Moreover, Munemo et al. (2007) argued 
that the effect of foreign aid on the economic activity of a country can be dampened due to potentially 
adverse effects on exports resulting from real exchange rate appreciation.  
Instead, Abe and Takarada (2005) found the condition under which the donor suffered from the tied 
aid while the recipient benefited from it, i.e. there is no inferior good in the donor country. However, 
both the donor and the recipient will benefit from the transfers at the expense of the rest world (Gale, 
1974; Lahiri and Raimondos ,1995). Kim and Kim (2016) considered foreign aid as a public good and 
examined the equilibrium aid strategies lying behind foreign aid provision. They showed that tied aid 
with higher exclusivity will increase the recipient’s welfare under an ineffectively worked 
international aid coordination mechanism, while untied aid with lower exclusivity will improve both 
donors’ and recipients’ welfare under a cooperative fashion. Unfortunately, it is difficult to distinguish 
between tied aid and untied aid. Since the tying percentage is only available as an aggregate figure for 
each donor, while it is unknown for each recipient (Wagner, 2003). 
2.2.2 Impact of Aid on Donors’ Trade Flows 
Donor self-interested and altruistic objectives are often linked to foreign aid, for instance, the political 
and economic interests of donors outweigh the developmental needs of the recipients (Hoeffler and 
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Outram, 2011). The main reason that donors provide aid to developing countries is to facilitate their 
exports to aid-recipient countries (Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2009). Hence, studies concentrate on the 
effects of aid on donors’ exports. 
There are a variety of aid mechanisms promoting the exports from donors to recipients. Arvin and 
Choudhry (1997) and Arvin and Baum (1997) differentiated tied aid from untied aid and found that 
untied aid is the catalyst of exports. They attributed it to goodwill for the donor in the recipient 
country generated by untied aid. Lloyd et al. (2000) argued that aid flows may create donor exports 
either due to the general economic effects on the recipient, or the direct aid-trade link, or the 
reinforced bilateral economic and political links, or a combination of all three. Using an intertemporal 
model of trade, Djajić et al. (2004) investigated the impact of aid on donor-recipient exports. The 
findings suggest that, in the presence of habit formation or ―goodwill‖ effects, aid may serve to shift 
preferences of the recipient in favor of the donor’s future exporting goods due to the terms-of-trade 
effect.  So when the effect is sufficiently large and the real interest rate is sufficiently low, the donor’s 
intertemporal gain would be positive. Therefore, development aid could lead to an increase in the 
donor’s exports for the following reasons: (1) ―tied aid‖ effect; (2) habit-formation effects; and (3) 
―goodwill‖ effects (Martínez‐Zarzoso et al., 2009). 
To evaluate the effect of aid on trade, the gravity model of trade is a prevailing theoretical framework 
(Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Extending the work of 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Silva and Nelson (2012) modeled the trade flow in an asymmetric 
structure and derived a positive significant impact of aid on exports from the donor to the recipient. 
This effect was widely examined in the literature (Nilsson,1997; Wagner ,2003; Martínez-Zarzoso et 
al., 2014). Similarly, Martínez‐Zarzoso et al. (2009) applied a static and dynamic gravity model of 
trade to investigate the link between German exports and development aid. The results demonstrated 
that German aid has a positive effect on German exports.  
In addition, there is a large body of literature that deviates from the gravity model framework. Using a 
dataset covering 137 recipient countries and the 22 donors of DAC of the OECD, Berthélemy (2006) 
revealed that most donors behave in a rather egoistic way, i.e. they provide aids to the most significant 
trading partners. Based on more extensive data of 168 recipient countries and 22 DAC donors, 
Hoeffler and Outram (2011) also found that DAC donors provide more aid to trade partners by 
controlling for time-invariant donor and recipient effects. However, Lloyd et al. (2000), examining 
data on 4 European donors and 26 African recipients, found little evidence that aid creates trade even 
tied aid, which is also proved by Osei et al. (2004), who extended the analysis to more countries. 
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2.2.3 Impact of Aid on Recipients’ Trade Flows 
The above mentioned studies mainly focus on the exports of donors. Studying the impact of aid on 
recipients’ trade flows is another analysis perspective. In this field, Chenery and Strout (1966) 
revealed that foreign assistance can fill the saving gap (the gap between investment and saving) and 
trade gap, and further raises exports. Under Harrod-Domar context, Hjertholm et al. (1998) found that 
foreign aid would close the recipient’s saving gap and trade gap, but with certain conditions: (1) 
financial and technical support for mobilization of domestic savings to close the saving gap ; and (2) 
export growth in excess of import growth to close the trade gap. In terms of the empirical modelling, 
the gravity model is widely accepted in the existing literature. Pettersson and Johansson (2013) and 
Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2010) showed that development aid is positively associated with recipient 
exports. Since aid enhances good bilateral trade relations, mutual trust and familiarity, which reinforce 
bilateral trade (Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2010).  
Focusing on specific types of aid, Helble et al. (2012) found that aid for trade is positively associated 
with recipient exports, while other aid flows, are negatively associated with recipient exports. To 
assure that the change in recipients’ trade can be traced back to the change in foreign aid, Nowak-
Lehmann et al. (2013) attributed it to the role played by unobservable or unquantifiable characteristics 
that affect donor-recipient relations, such as reputation, mutual trust and support, goodwill and 
familiarity as well as  customer relations, distribution channels and a better adaptation to the formal 
and informal market environment. However, they did not find significant effect of aid on exports of 
recipient countries in an empirical perspective. 
In view of recipients’ imports, Kruse and Martínez-Zarzoso (2016) considered the foreign aid as a 
transfer instead of being part of the trade cost in the augmented Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
model, and found that the aid shifts the budget constraint outwards and increases the recipients’ 
purchasing power, hence, causing additional imports. Lloyd et al. (2000) studied the aid and trade 
flows from UK, France, Netherlands and Germany to 26 African countries over 1969 to 1995, and the 
results show little evidence of linkage existence between aid and recipients’ imports. Furthermore, 
Osei et al. (2004) found that even tied aid will not increase imports.  
In general, the existing literature about the impact of foreign aid on trade predominantly focuses on 
exports, but attention has been paid to the aid-import relationship, especially from the donors’ 
perspective. In terms of the empirical specification, the gravity model of trade is considered as the 
prevailing framework, which has been persistently getting theoretical and empirical improvement. 
Geographically, Africa is widely examined in the literature due to its developing status quo, and 
related donor countries are usually the European economies for the colonial relatives with African 
countries. As the two largest economies in the world, both the US and China are offering aid to Africa 
in line with their strategic plans that may be related to their demands on natural resources from Africa. 
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Nonetheless, there is little empirical comprehensive research on the comparison of both the US and 
China’s aid to Africa and their aid-trade relationships from a dynamic perspective. Our study is filling 
the gap in the literature and contributing to better understand the motivation of the aid from US and 
China to Africa.  
3 Donor-Recipient Trade Relations 
3.1 US-Africa Trade Relations 
The bilateral economic ties between the US and Africa strengthened after the end of the apartheid era 
in South Africa in the early 1990s (Jones and Williams, 2012). In subsequent years, the Administration 
and Congress implemented several measures and developed legislation to improve the US-Africa trade 
relations, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) approved by the Congress in 2000. 
Since the initial enactment, AGOA has made a great contribution to the trade between US and Africa. 
Trade volume between US and beneficiaries doubled during the period 2001-2014.4 Nevertheless, the 
US-Africa trade volume totaled only 53 billion USD in 2015, just more than one third of the peak 
value in 2008 (146 billion USD).  
According to the Economist,5 Africa has a population of 1.1 billion and six of the world’s ten fastest-
growing economies. Africa therefore has been an important strategic area to the US. No matter where 
it stands politically or economically, the US involvement in Africa has seen an ever increasing pace in 
recent years, and foreign aid is a crucial instrument to maintain US influence in the African continent. 
The Development Fund for Africa (DFA), established by the Congress in 1988, is essentially a 
permanent earmark of economic development funds for Sub-Saharan Africa. The Agency for 
International Development spent 800 million USD in DFA funds in 1993, which would be used to 
fund various AID activities, including direct cash assistance to support imports (Sheehy and 
Foundation, 1993). At the Conference on Financing Development in Monterrey held in March 2002, 
US announced the ―Millennium Challenge Account‖ with the injection of a 5 billion USD fund that 
was designated for the poorest developing world. In addition, the Congress was set to provide the 
administration with 2.4 billion USD for HIV/AIDS programs in 15 countries, primarily in Africa and 
the Caribbean region. It is well known that most unstable countries are from the African continent.6 
Hence, strategically assisting only a few African countries is a key feature of the US aid to Africa. In 
                                                     
4 Trade volume between US and beneficiaries decreased sharply in 2009, which was possibly due to the spillover 
effects of the global financial crisis. 
5 The Economist. ―Africa’s impressive growth‖, Jan 6th 2011. http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/ 
01/daily_ chart (accessed May 10, 2016). 
6 According to the Fragile States Index 2017 of the Fund for peace, among the ten most unstable countries, six 
are African countries. Unstable factors are related to poverty, which is a big threat to the safety of US, even the 
world. 
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2014, US provided approximately 9.3 billion USD aid to Africa, more than half of which is to Sub-
Sahara Africa.  
As the largest economy on the planet, the US consumes more natural resources than any other large 
economy in the rest world. The US continuously aids Africa in the hope that bilateral trade relations 
between the two could be enhanced, as the US needs to ensure its development of international trade, 
especially importing nature resources from African countries. In 2014, among the US top ten largest 
aid recipients, four of them are the largest trading partners of the US in Africa (see Table 1).7  
Table 1: US Top Ten Largest Trading Partners and Aid Recipients in Africa (2014) (Million USD) 
  Aid Recipient Value 
Trade 
Partner  
Value Importer Value Exporter Value 
1 Kenya 807.37 South Africa 14.83 Egypt 6.47 South Africa 8.47 
2 South Sudan 796.07 Nigeria 9.90 South Africa 6.37 Angola 5.84 
3 Ethiopia 664.84 Egypt 7.95 Nigeria 5.97 Algeria 4.79 
4 South Africa 515.02 Angola 7.88 Algeria 2.62 Nigeria 3.94 
5 Tanzania 509.01 Algeria 7.41 Morocco 2.10 Chad 2.38 
6 Nigeria 485.59 Morocco 3.16 Angola 2.04 Egypt 1.48 
7 Uganda 470.07 Chad 2.45 Ethiopia 1.67 Côte d'Ivoire 1.24 
8 Mozambique 395.38 Kenya 2.25 Kenya 1.64 Morocco 1.05 
9 Congo, D.R. 385.06 Ethiopia 1.88 Ghana 1.19 Gabon 0.83 
10 Zambia 321.06 Côte d'Ivoire 1.47 Togo 1.02 Kenya 0.61 
Source: UN Comtrade and OECD. 
3.2 Sino-Africa Trade Relations 
Sino-Africa trade relations can be dated back to the first Han emperors in the Second Century B.C. 
(Renard, 2011).  Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Sino-Africa trade 
has increased dramatically, especially after China’s opening up in 1978. The opening up of the 
Chinese economy was accompanied by the fast-growing trade with African countries. In the late 1990s, 
China’s remarkable economic performance made policy-makers realize that the future continuous 
supply of natural resources is needed in order to maintain a stable growth (Busse et al., 2014). Africa, 
with huge market potential and abundant nature resources, has become a strategically important region 
for China. Moreover, China’s ―going-global‖ strategy, a further shift in the open-door policies, was 
also a key factor impacting Sino-African economic relations. To encourage foreign trade and outward 
foreign direct investment, a series of incentive measures including easy access to bank loans, 
simplified customs procedures, and preferential policies for taxation, importing and exporting were 
provided to Chinese firms (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2007). In 2000, the First Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in Beijing and passed the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in 
                                                     
7 To be coherent with the China-Africa trade data, the US-Africa trade data in 2012 is given in appendix Table A. 1, which 
also supports the argument above. 
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Economic and Social Development. Since then, Sino-Africa economic relations have surged. The 
value of total Sino-Africa trading volume was just 8.9 billion USD in 2000. In 2009, it reached 70.4 
billion USD that surpassed the US-Africa trading value (62 billion USD). From then on, China has 
been the largest trading partner of Africa for the successive eight years. The Sino-Africa trading 
volume reached 149 billion USD in 2016, more than fourteen times the level in 2000.  
Figure 2: 2000-2012 China’s Foreign Aid Allocation 
 
Source: White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid (2014) 
China has been focusing on the development of South-South cooperation in pursuit of an equal and 
mutual development. One way to build the mutual trust is to offer foreign aid to African countries, and 
in return, the trade relationship between China and African economies has ever prospered. Over the 
past decade, China’s aid to Africa has increased in line with the surging Sino-Africa trade. According 
to the White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid 2014, more than 50% of China’s aid was provided to 
African countries, see Figure 2. The main fields where China is most active in Africa are infrastructure 
and construction projects (Busse et al., 2014). China normally provides aid in the forms of grants, 
zero-interest loans and preferential loans. On the sixth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2015, 
China’s president Xi Jinping committed a total of 60 billion USD investments to Africa, including 5 
billion USD for grants and zero-interest loans, 35 billion USD for concessional loans and buyer’s 
credit, and the remaining for commercial financing. In addition, ten overarching plans for Sino-Africa 
cooperation were proposed on the summit, one of which is the trade and investment facilitation. China 
will carry out fifty aid-for-trade programs to improve Africa’s capacity, both ―software‖ and 
―hardware‖, to promote trade and investment between the two sides. On the Belt and Road Forum in 
May 2017, China promised again to provide assistance worth 60 billion RMB (8.7 billion USD) in the 
coming three years to developing countries and international organizations participating in the Belt 
and Road Initiative, which will facilitate connectivity and achieve unimpeded trade. 
The foreign aid projects in Africa supported by the Chinese government, are often associated with 
trade activities (Biggeri and Sanfilippo, 2009). Among China’s top ten largest aid recipients, six of 
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them are China’s largest trading partners in Africa in 2012 (see Table 2). For instance, the Republic of 
Congo received a total of 3 billion USD aid from China in 2012. At the same time, it is China’s major 
trading partner in Africa in terms of both the volumes of total trade and imports. This is an example of 
aid-trade relationship that reflects the strategic interaction between China and Africa. 
Table 2: China’s Top Ten Largest Trading Partners and Aid Recipients in Africa (2012)(Million USD) 
 
Aid Recipient Value Trade  Partner Value Importer Value Exporter Value 
1 Congo 3006 South Africa 6.00 South Africa 15.32 South Africa 44.65 
2 Tanzania 1748 Angola 3.76 Nigeria 9.30 Angola 33.56 
3 Ethiopia 1565 Nigeria 1.06 Egypt 8.22 Libya 6.38 
4 Nigeria 1258 Egypt 0.95 Algeria 5.42 Congo 4.56 
5 Egypt 1131 Libya 0.88 Ghana 4.79 Congo, D.R. 3.53 
6 Cameroon 6579 Algeria 0.77 Angola 4.04 Zambia 2.69 
7 Angola 5158 Ghana 0.54 Liberia 3.45 Algeria 2.31 
8 Kenya 3696 Congo 0.51 Togo 3.38 Sudan 2.05 
9 Mozambique 3257 Congo, D.R. 0.44 Morocco 3.13 Equatorial Guinea 1.82 
10 Sudan 2475 Sudan 0.37 Kenya 2.79 Mauritania 1.47 
Source: UN Comtrade and AidData. 
4. The Gravity Model and Econometric Methods 
4.1 The Augmented Gravity Model 
The gravity model is becoming increasingly popular in international trade studies, as it relates bilateral 
trade flows to gross domestic product (GDP), distance and many other factors that affect trade barriers 
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Typically, the log-linear gravity model specifies the trade flow 
from one country to country, that could be jointly interpreted by economic forces at the original 
country, economic forces at the destination country, and other economic forces that may either assist 
or resist the movement of the trade flow from origin to destination (Bergstrand, 1985). Following 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Carrere (2006) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007), we construct an 
augmented gravity model to investigate the effects of US and China aid to Africa on the donor-
recipient trade  relations.  
Tradeij = β0 ODAij 
β1 GDPij 
β2 FDIij 
β3 DISTij 
β4 eβ5(Tfree i )e δk zi
mk
k =1 εij  
(1)    
Where Tradeij  is the aggregate merchandise trade flow from donor country j to recipient country i,  
ODAij  is the value of official development assistance (ODA) from country j to country i, GDPij  is the 
difference of per capita GDP between countries i and j,8 FDIij  is the stock of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) of country i from country j, DISTij  is the distance between countries i and j, Tfreei  represents the 
                                                     
8 We include the difference of per capita GDP in the model to observe the impact of relative purchasing power  
on the donor-recipient trade relations.  
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freedom of trade in country i,9  zi
m  is the six Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) for country i, 
including voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption, e is the natural logarithm base, 
and εij  is the error term that is assumed to be log-normally distributed.
10 In this study, country i 
designates recipient countries and country j represents donor countries (US and China).  
Formal theoretical foundations for a gravity model similar to Equation (1)  appeared since the 1970s, 
for instance, Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003). Theoretically, these papers have a common feature in highlighting the important role 
of price levels, i.e. bilateral or multilateral price indexes. The omitted variables bias like ignoring 
prices in the cross-section gravity model is concerned by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Baier 
and Bergstrand (2007). Based on their framework, the suggested gravity model of the augmented form 
in Equation (1) can be transformed into the following: 
ln  
Tradeij
GDPij
 = β
0
+ β
1
lnODAij + β3lnFDIij + β4lnDISTij + β5Tfreei
+  δk zi
m − lnpi
1−ζ − lnpj
1−ζ + εij
k
k=1
 
 
(2) 
The minimization of Equation (2) is subject to:  
pj
1−ζ =  pi
ζ−1(GDPi/GDPG)e
β1lnODA ij +β3lnFDI ij +β4lnDIST ij +β5Tfree i + δk zi
mk
k =1
N
i
 
 
  (3) 
Where pj
1−ζ refers to multilateral price resistance terms,  GDPG  is the global GDP, constant across 
countries. As suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the system can be estimated applying a 
custom nonlinear least square method assuming all pj
1−ζ as endogenous variables. But this approach 
has a complex computational process that is not preferred by many researchers (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). An alternative and computationally easier approach to 
account for multilateral price levels in cross section data could be a country specific fixed effect that 
could also generate unbiased estimates (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Wagner, 2003; Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2007). 
                                                     
9 Existing studies have complex discussions about trade barriers between countries, such as Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) and Carrere (2006). For simplicity, we use the degree of trade freedom of the destination which 
measures a wide rarity of trade barriers that affect trade flow, instead of the barriers to trade. 
10 The existing literature has different theoretical foundations for the gravity model, e.g., the incorporation of 
exporter and importer populations or GDPs for each country. Theoretical foundations of this alternative model 
still need to be refined. This is beyond the scope of this study, but it is an issue discussed by Anderson (1979), 
Bergstrand (1985) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). 
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4.2 Econometric Modelling 
Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Wagner (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007), we 
use country fixed effects to account for endogeneity bias from bilateral or multilateral price terms. The 
log-linear version of Equation (1) has the following form: 
lnTradeij ,t = β0 + β1lnODAij ,t + β2lnGDPij ,t + β3lnFDIij ,t + β4lnDISTij ,t + β5Tfreei,t +  δkzi,t
m
k
k=1
+ εij ,t  (4) 
In Equation (4) we add the time subscript t to express time variations of related terms from the donor 
country to the recipient country. As the data set contains repeated observations over time for countries, 
we can control for unobserved individual heterogeneity that is constant over time.11  
lnTradeij ,t = β0 + β1lnODAij ,t + β2lnGDPij ,t + β3lnFDIij ,t + β4lnDISTij ,t + β5Tfreei,t +  δkzi,t
m
k
k=1
+ η
ij
+ εij ,t  (5) 
 Rewrite the above equation as: 
yij ,t = xij ,t
′ β + η
ij
+ εij ,t   (6) 
Where yij ,t  is lnTradeij ,t , xij ,t
′  is a group of explanatory variables ( lnODAij ,t , lnGDPij ,t , 
lnFDIij ,t ,  lnDISTij ,t , Tfreei,t   and  zi,t
m ), η
ij
 is the unobserved constant individual effects, i=1,…N, 
j=1,…M, t=1,…,T. We restructure Equation (5) as: yij ,t = xij ,t
′ β + uij ,t , and uij ,t = ηij + εij ,t . We 
assume E εij ,t = 0, E εij ,t|xij ,t = 0. The random effects specification further assumes that E  ηij =
0 and E  η
ij
|xij ,t = 0. It means that the individual effect ηij  is uncorrelated with regressors xij ,t . The 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator takes into account the dependence of the error term within 
individual over time by weighting the observations on the basis of a consistent estimate of variance-
covariance matrix.  
However, the more likely and interesting case is that the unobserved individual effects are correlated 
with explanatory variables: E  η
ij
|xij ,t ≠ 0 . In such a case, the GLS estimator is biased and 
inconsistent. A possible solution is to estimate the model with a separate intercept for each individual 
by OLS. Since η
ij
= yij   − xij   
′β − εij , β parameters can be estimated the transformed, within group 
model by OLS:  
                                                     
11 The gravity model has two inherent limitations. On the one hand, the selection of control variables is important for the 
empirical estimates. Our selection of control variables is appropriable for this study. On the other hand, the selection of 
instrument variables determines the model performance. Each instrument variable in this study has been carefully examined 
and the results prove the validation of those instrument variables. 
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yij ,t − y ij = (xij ,t − x ij )
′β + (εij ,t − ε ij ) (7)  
For fixed effects (or the within group estimator), therefore, only the effects of variables that change 
over time can be estimated. The fixed effects estimator is unbiased when the xij ,t  in all periods are 
uncorrelated with the εij ,s  in all periods: E xij ,t  εij ,s = 0 , for s=1,…,T, t=1,…,T. Usually, the 
Hausman test is used to examine whether the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the 
regressors. It is given by: H = (β 
FE
− β 
RE
)′[Var  β 
FE
 − Var  β 
RE
 ]−1(β 
FE
− β 
RE
) . If H is large, 
random effects estimator is rejected in favor of the fixed effects estimator.   
Considering that bilateral trades are usually dependent on the previous trades, a dynamic model 
specification with the following form is introduced (Arellano and Bond, 1991): 
yij ,t = αyij ,t−1 + xij ,t
′ β + η
ij
+ εij ,t  (8) 
Where in this equation, β is the short-run effect and 
β
1−α
 is the long-run steady state effect. yij ,t  is 
clearly correlated with unobserved heterogeneity. The OLS estimator is biased upwards and the fixed 
effects estimator is biased downwards. An instrumental variables estimator that uses this information 
optimally is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. Valid instruments are lagged 
levels yij ,t−2 , yij ,t−3 , …, yij ,1 , since E  yij ,t−2 εij ,t − εij ,t−1  = 0 . The GMM estimator adopts the 
moment condition to estimate the parameters consistently and efficiently in two steps. The Sargan and 
Hansen tests are commonly used to test the validity of the instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991).12 
5. Data Description 
Bilateral trade data covering the period 2003-2012 between US/China and African countries are used 
in this study. Specifically, bilateral trade data of 26 African economies for the US and 30 for China 
were collected.13 Data on bilateral exports and imports are obtained from the United Nations Comtrade 
Statistics Database. Following Pettersson and Johansson (2013), we use reported exports and imports, 
for instance, Angola’s imports from China are China’s exports to Angola which are reported by China. 
Total trade is the sum of exports and imports between donors and recipients. For the US, ODA data 
are obtained from the OECD Statistics, which provides ODA commitments and disbursements for 
OECD-DAC members. Since we focus on the impact of ODA on trade, our analysis only considers 
disbursements rather commitments data. Data on China’s ODA can be collected from the AidData. US 
and China’s FDI stock are provided by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
                                                     
12 The null hypothesis for the test is that the instruments are valid in the sense that they are not correlated with 
errors in the first-differenced equation.  
13 There is no problem of data inconsistency as we are running panel data estimations by donor. 
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(UNCTAD) and the Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, respectively.14 
Per capita GDP are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) Online database. We are 
mainly interested in the impact of relative purchasing power on trade, hence, the absolute difference of 
per capita GDP between countries i and j is used in our analysis. Geographical distance between 
capital cities15  is from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) 
database. Trade freedom data are provided by the Heritage Foundation. Data on voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law and control of corruption are taken from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) online database. Economic development level (Ecolevel) is given the values 1-4 if 
the country belongs to low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and high-income 
countries, respectively. It is consistent with the classification in the World Development Report 2014 
released by the World Bank.16 Detailed variable definition and data sources are given in appendix 
Error! Reference source not found.. Table 3 presents summary statistics of the variables during 2003-2012 
for the US and China, respectively.  
Insert Table 3 about here  
6. Empirical Analysis 
We now turn to the empirical analysis of the effects of aid-to-Africa on the bilateral trade relationship 
between US/China and Africa. In this section, we are not only interested in the impact of aid on the 
total trading volume, but also an insight into the exporting and importing behaviors of donors, i.e., 
whether the donors are dumping products to Africa or importing natural resources from Africa. To 
observe the short-run and long-run effects of foreign aid on bilateral trade, both static and dynamic 
specifications are estimated.  
                                                     
14  Missing values for FDI stock data are replenished via the normalization method: 
FDInew =
(FDIi − μFDI )
σFDI . 
15 Following Helpman et al. (2007), we use geographical distance between capital cities. With the development 
of transportation, the different distance measures seem to make no difference.  
16 The classification is in line with the World Bank’s criterion based on the country’s GNI per capita in 2012. A 
country with a GNI per capita of 1035 USD or less is referred as a low-income economy; a country with a GNI 
per capita of more than 1035 USD but less than 4086 USD is regarded as a lower-middle-income economy; a 
country with a GNI per capita of more than 4086 USD but less than 12616 USD is considered as a upper-middle-
income economy; and a country with a GNI per capita of 12616 USD or more is treated as a high-income 
economy. The Economic development level (Ecolevel) is only used as an instrument variable in the GMM 
estimation, therefore it is not list in the summary statistics of Table 3.   
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6.1 Findings on the US-Recipient Trade Relationship 
6.1.1 Impact on Total Trade 
Table 4 reports the estimates of the impact of US aid to Africa on the bilateral trade. The linear 
regression model (4) is estimated firstly using OLS (see column 1). The coefficient associated with the 
variable of interest, aid (lnODA), is statistically insignificant. This might imply that the aid to Africa 
does not exhibit significant impact on the US-Africa total trading volume, which could be due to the 
inefficiency of the pooled linear regression model.17 The OLS results do little about the problem of 
unmeasured variables that affect both trade and aid volumes between countries.  
To control unobserved individual heterogeneity, model (6) is estimated and the results are shown in 
columns 2-3. The Hausman test indicates that the fixed effects model is preferred. However, no 
significant impact can be found on the total trade between US and its recipient countries. It implies 
that the US aid to Africa is not an indispensable catalysts for the bilateral trade relation, which 
conforms to the practice. These results seem not to support the assumption that aid increases trade. A 
possible reason could be that trade benefits of foreign aid are not only limited to the current year.  
Dynamic model (8) with lagged terms of dependent variable (trade) and aid and FDI, is estimated 
using first-differenced GMM to avoid the problems of omitted variable and reverse causality. In Table 
4, the model diagnostics show that the first difference GMM model is correctly specified and the 
instruments we use are valid.18 The coefficients of lnODA and L.lnODA capturing the effects of 
foreign aid on bilateral trade between the US and Africa in the short- and medium-run are still 
statistically insignificant. This could be explained by the priority of the strategic and security interests 
of the US. Additionally, the lagged terms of trade (L.lnTrade and L2.lnTrade) are insignificant, which 
further proves that the trade relationship is not the main intention for the US aid to Africa. For 
remaining regressors, such as the governance indicators and other macroeconomic conditions, some of 
the control variables show significant impact on trade flows. But in this study, we take them as 
                                                     
17 Strong serial correlations exist in the regression residuals (not reported). This indicates the inappropriateness 
of the pooled regression model.  
18 The instrument variables used are the lagged term of dependent variable, the lagged term of independent 
variables (lnFDI, lnGDP and lnODA), lnDIST, Tfree and Ecolevel. In the panel data analysis, the lagged terms 
of endogenous independent variables are usually used as instrument variables. On the one hand, they are related 
to endogenous independent variables. On the other hand, they are predetermined and unrelated to the error term. 
While Tfree and Ecolevel are also met the two conditions above. Moreover, lagged dependent variable and 
lnDIST are strictly exogenous. Without special statement, the instrument variables employed in the following 
sections are like that used here, and the model diagnostics show that the first difference GMM model is correctly 
specified and the instruments we use are valid. 
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exogenous when we analyze the impact of foreign aid on the donor-recipient trade relationship. 
Hereafter, the effects of these control variables are not discussed.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
6.1.2 Impact on US Exports to Africa 
In terms of the impact of US aid on its exports to Africa, the estimated coefficient for aid (lnODA) is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in the linear regression test as shown in the first 
column of Table 5. This implies that the US exports to Africa has benefited from its aid to Africa. 
However, the serial correction test indicates the misspecification of the linear regression model (not 
reported for brevity).  
Columns 2-3 report results of fixed effects and random effects models, respectively. The Hausman test 
shows the preference for the random effects model. The estimates from random effects model reveal 
that the effects of US aid on US exports to Africa is lower, falling to 0.07, but still remains 
significantly different from zero in this case compared to the OLS estimates regardless of the model 
misspecification. The result suggests that a 1% increase in the US aid to African countries increases 
US exports to African partners by about 0.07%.  
Dynamic model (8) with lagged terms of the dependent and independent variables, including aid and 
per capita GDP, is estimated to explore the long-run effects of aid on exports. It is puzzling that the aid 
coefficient is high but barely significant for the US exports to Africa compared with random effects 
result. The lagged exports also do not exhibit any impact on US exports to Africa. One might believe 
that trade benefits from aid would persist because customer/supplier relationships have been 
established (Wagner, 2003), but the result suggests that the trading relationship establishment is 
valueless. 
Insert Table 5 about here  
6.1.3 Impact on US Imports from Africa 
Table 6 presents the estimates of the effects of US aid on US imports from Africa. A negative but 
insignificant coefficient for aid (lnODA) is found from the OLS estimator, which means that US 
imports from Africa are not affected by US aid to African countries. The pooled OLS regression does 
little about the problem of unmeasured variables that affect both imports and aid volumes between 
countries. When controlling for unobserved individual effects, the estimated coefficient of interest, 
foreign aid (lnODA), is still negative and scarcely significant. As indicated by the Hausman test, the 
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fixed effects model is preferred. However, the dynamic effects should be considered to confirm the 
insignificant impact of US aid to Africa on its imports from the African recipients.  
Taking into account the dynamic effects, foreign aid remains showing its negative but relatively 
stronger effect on US imports from Africa compared with fixed effects estimator. Nevertheless, the 
statistical significance of the aid coefficient is unchanged. The insignificant coefficient for foreign aid 
might be due to the reason that the motivation of promoting foreign trade between the two sides is not 
as strong as the strategic and security needs for the US, despite the fact that the US is trying to secure 
oil and energy supplies from Africa. Interestingly, the one-period lagged term of imports is 
significantly negative, but the two-period lagged term of import becomes insignificant. The results 
might imply that the preceding US imports from Africa would hamper the current imports. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
6.2 Findings on the China-Recipient Trade Relationship 
In line with the preceding section, both the static and dynamic models are estimated for the total trade 
flow between China and Africa. As we are interested in investigating if China’s aid to Africa promotes 
more exports to African recipients, or imports more (natural resources) from Africa. Therefore, the 
same approaches are applied to estimate the impact of China’s aid on its exports to and imports from 
Africa, respectively. Tables 7-9 report the main estimation results for distinguishing the aid-trade 
relations with different model specifications. 
6.2.1 Impact on Total Trade 
We start from the linear regression test of the impact of China’s aid to Africa on the bilateral total 
trade. The evidence shows that the impact of China’s aid is positive and significant in the pooled OLS, 
as shown in Table 7, but the linear regression model does not account for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity and there also exists severe serial correlations. In contrast to the OLS estimator, the 
fixed effects or random effects model can eliminate the unobserved effects, as discussed in the 
methodology section. Moreover, the R-squared value of the OLS estimates is lower than that of the 
fixed effects and random effects model results, indicating that the latter models are more appropriate 
than the former one. Concerning the choice between fixed effects and random effects models, the 
Hausman test is rejected. It means that the fixed effects model is favored in this case. We are 
interested in the coefficient of foreign aid. The estimated within group coefficient indicates that a 1% 
increase in China’s aid to Africa raises bilateral trade by 0.037%, which is much smaller in magnitude 
than the OLS estimates. Nevertheless, it is still positive and significant at the 5% level.  
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The estimates of the first differenced GMM model are also presented in Table 7. The results reveal 
that the current flow of foreign aid impedes total trade between China and African recipient countries. 
An upturn of China’s aid to Africa by 1% decreases bilateral total trade by 0.04%. While the one-
period lagged term indicates a significant and positive effect on bilateral trade. The overall effect of 
foreign aid on bilateral trade is therefore confirmed with the dynamic specification, with an increase of 
10% in aid increases bilateral trade by about 0.21% (-0.4% plus 0.61%), which is mainly determined 
by the one-period lagged term of foreign aid. It implies that the current aid to Africa from China does 
not promote the bilateral total trade. As time goes by, the preceding foreign aid appears to have a 
positive impact on bilateral trade. This could be explained by the following three reasons: (1) once a 
trading relationship has been created by the aid, the relationship may yield additional transactions, e.g., 
follow-up work, supplies, upgrades, or complementary products; (2) future transactions resulting from 
reduced costs; and (3) strengthened ability for customers and suppliers to transact with other 
enterprises in the customer’s/supplier’s country. Interestingly, the one-period lagged trade shows 
significant and positive effect on current trade volume between China and African recipients, while 
the two-period lagged term exhibits significant but negative effect. The former coefficient is larger 
than the later one in magnitude, which is in line with our expectations.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
6.2.2 Impact on China’s Exports to Africa 
Table 8 reports the results of the impact of aid on China’s exports to African economies. The aid 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in the OLS results, but we tend to 
reject the analysis since the existence of serial correlation. Both the fixed effects and random effects 
estimation results present positive effects of aid on China’s exports to Africa, which is consistent with 
the findings of the existing literature. Swee-Hock (2007) saw it as the result of expanding exports of 
equipments and goods by China’s aid program. The Hausman test seems to accept that fixed effects 
estimator is more preferred. The evidence suggests that a 1% increase in aid leads to an upturn of 
approximately 0.05% in China’s exports to Africa.  
The GMM model estimates in Table 8, which take into account the lagged effects of foreign aid and 
exports, reveal that aid has a positive but insignificant impact on China’s exports to Africa. However, 
the one-period lagged term displays positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level. It 
means that foreign aid would not exhibit any impact on China’s exports to Africa immediately, but 
affect the exports in the next period. It could be explained by the following reasons. First, the aid-
induced growth implies a greater capacity of the recipient country to absorb foreign products, 
including those originating from donors (Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier, 2007). Second, foreign aid 
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can generate good-will and familiarity effects that promote donor’s exports (Martínez‐Zarzoso et al., 
2014). Nonetheless, these effects may take time. Along this line, aid flows are likely to promote more 
international trade flows in the recipient country in the medium-run and even long-run. As expected, 
the overall impact of lagged term of exports is positive and significant, but the coefficient on the two-
period lagged exports is negative. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
6.2.3 Impact on China’s Imports from Africa 
By looking at the impact of China’s aid on its imports from Africa, we can understand if the aid 
program has enhanced China’s imports from the African counterparts, which could be the strategic 
plan of the Chinese authorities. The OLS estimation results in Table 9 indicate that aid has a positive 
and significant impact on China’s imports from Africa, which implies that China’s aid is a catalyst for 
Chinese imports from Africa.  
To control for unobserved individual effects, fixed effects and random effects models are estimated. 
The Hausman test indicates the preference of the fixed effects model. It is worth noting that the 
estimated within coefficient of aid is positive but insignificant. Despite that, it does not mean that aid 
has no effect on China’s imports from Africa, as it may play a role in promoting the imports in the 
following periods.  
As discussed previously, a dynamic model based on the specification (8) with the inclusion of lagged 
terms of aid is estimated to capture the time-varying effects of aid. The results are presented in Table 9, 
indicating that the present aid does not have any impact on China’s imports from Africa, but a positive 
effect appears to be significant in the following period, which can be explained by the establishment of 
trading relationship resulting from aid. As expected, the one period lagged imports exhibits positive 
impact on China’s imports from Africa. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
6.3 Discussions 
As for the methodology employed in the previous section, OLS, which is prevailing to estimate the 
gravity model in the related literature, is firstly used to estimate linear regression model (4). To control 
unobserved individual heterogeneity, fixed effects and random effects estimators are given then. 
Furthermore, considering the lagged term of dependent variable in the dynamic model, difference-
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GMM is applied. The estimators from both the static and dynamic perspective would ensure the 
reliability and robustness of the results. 
With reference to the impact on total trade, strong and positive effects are shown in the Chinese aid, 
but not in the US aid. This indicates that trade interests are more crucial to China than the US.  
Furthermore, lagged effects of Chinese aid on total trade are observed in the empirical results. For the 
US, we do not observe any significant effects of aid on trade. An explanation for the difference might 
be due to the economic development stages. China is still a developing country with a low per-capita 
income and a large poverty-stricken population. For this reason, the need of economic development is 
much more important. In reality, foreign trade is a key element of Chinese economic activities as it has 
contributed to approximately 50% of the Chinese GDP since China joined the WTO. Foreign aid 
policy reflects China’s national priority in terms of economic interests.19 China’s aid to Africa is in 
line with China’s Africa Policy, which is also important for China’s ―package deals‖ to Africa (Busse 
et al., 2014). Being the largest donor in the aid market, trade interests in the US aid are not as 
important as that in China’s aid, but aid is indispensible for the US to protect its existing global 
structure of power and wealth (Johansen, 2014). Despite the trade interest of aid is not as important as 
the strategic and security interests for the US in the current global climate, it used to play a significant 
role in enhancing US foreign trade, e.g., the Marshall Plan.20 However, the first US-Africa Leader 
Summit held in 2014 implies that the core of the US policy in Africa is shifted from security concerns 
into economic development opportunity. 
It is worth noting that donor’s exports to recipients are positively correlated with foreign aid, both for 
the US and China. However, the positive effects are much more significant and long-lasting in the case 
of China. We tend to attribute it to the following three reasons. First of all, Chinese aid, provided 
without any political conditions attached, could avoid the foreign aid dilemma from Western 
countries21 and is more effective in generating long run growth (Wang and Ozanne, 2010). Hence, 
China’s aid is more likely to be accepted by African countries. Secondly, government subsidized 
concessional loans and project joint ventures are the specific initiative of ―Grand aid‖ policies for 
investment and trade (Shimomura and Ohashi, 2013). Through infrastructure projects and revenue 
                                                     
19  Sun, Y. China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah? Brookings East Asia Commentary. No. 75 of 88, 
February 2014. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/07-china-aid-to-africa-sun 
(accessed May 24, 2016). 
20 The Marshall Plan was an American initiative to aid Western Europe by offering economic support of 13 
billion USD to help rebuild Western European economies after the end of World War II. One goal of the plan 
was to remove trade barriers. Because of the operation of Marshall Plan, the fastest period of growth in European 
history was seen during the years 1948 to 1952. In addition, economic prosperity of Western European provided 
vast market for the American products, which was pivotal for alleviating the destruction of economic crisis in the 
US. 
21 Conditional aid provided by the West unduly penalizes countries at the bottom, e.g. most African countries are 
worse off than they were at independence after decades of ever increasing aid for Western countries. 
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creation, China’s aid contributes to the long-term economic development of African countries.  Finally, 
both the US and China have implemented a policy of tied aid. The members of OECD-DAC agreed to 
remove tied aid since 1995 due to the increasing cost and low efficiency. But the Chinese experience 
indicates that tied aid has the advantage of facilitating learning by doing and learning by implementing 
projects (Lin and Wang, 2015). Hence, most Chinese development assistance is tied. Although the US 
tied aid had reduced from 72% in 1996 to 54% in 2006 and to 36.8% in 2014, it remains common 
among the US foreign aid programs. In addition, the reduction of tying percentage does not mean the 
decline of trade benefits, since a majority of the de facto beneficiary of the aid are domestic firms from 
donor countries (Kim and Kim, 2016).  
Concerning the effects of foreign aid on donors’ imports, a positive long-run impact is indicated in 
China’s aid, while it does not appear in the case of US. China currently faces a huge demand-supply 
gap of resource and energy, so does the US. Even so, more strategic concerns are related in US aid, 
which is serving the national interests. China’s aid is provided within the framework of South-South 
cooperation. China’s development needs Africa, in particular the natural resources while Africa has 
benefited from the capital and technology input from China as well. China’s aid, based on the basic 
principles of equality and mutual respect, has been keeping the promise of mutual benefits and win-
win. However, it has to be admitted that China’s foreign aid policy is indeed an internationally 
controversial issue. Many resource-rich African countries suffer from serious political problems, such 
as authoritarianism, poor governance and corruption. Chinese aid, without conditionality, is said to 
hamper good governance in Africa (Wang and Ozanne, 2010). Besides, China’s aid is usually accused 
of plundering the African continent’s natural resources. For instance, the ―Angola-model‖ is 
disputable for China’s swapping infrastructure projects for mineral resources.  Nevertheless, China’s 
aid indeed contributed to the awakening of fast-growing African ―lion economies‖ (Habiyaremye, 
2013). 
7. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the effects of US and China’s foreign aid to Africa on the 
donor-recipient trade relationships. Specially, it focuses on the effects of foreign aid on different trade 
flows between the donor and the recipient, including total trade, exports and imports. The key findings 
are summarized as follows. First, only a positive effect of foreign aid on the US exports to Africa is 
found in the short-run. The findings are consistent with the notion that foreign aid boosts exports, 
particularly in the donor countries. Whereas, the total trade between US and Africa and the US imports 
from Africa are not affected by the US aid due to its strategic concerns. Second, China’s aid exhibits a 
positive effect on the trade flows with African recipients, not only on total trade but also on exports 
and imports. Third, promoting bilateral trade is the main interest for China to aid the African 
counterparts. China’s foreign aid, provided within the framework of South-South cooperation to 
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integrate the interests of Chinese people with people of other countries, is a mutual beneficial and win-
win activity for both sides, and also serves to balance the interests of China and its African partners. 
Although China is the second largest economy, it is still a developing country with a low per-capita 
income and a large poverty-stricken population. China needs to boost its exports and secure natural 
resources from Africa. China provides unconditional aid to Africa, and in return, African countries 
import more Chinese products and export their abundant natural resources to China. For the US, its 
foreign aid used to be a catalyst to boost bilateral trade in history, whereas its trade interests are 
currently overtaken by the strategic and security interests. 
The empirical evidence seems to suggest that a positive relationship between aid and trade would be 
expected if China insists on its existing foreign aid policy, and the bilateral ties will be strengthened as 
well. Thus, these results are applicable to other regions of the world. While for the US, the results 
might be different and can hardly be generalizable to other parts of the world due to its offer of 
conditional aid to recipient nations. More importantly, the intention behind the tied aid might be 
different, such as natural resources and political interference tied to the aid to Africa and the Middle 
East, but political and military influence to the Asia-pacific nations. Therefore, the impact of the US 
aid to other regions should be explored case by case.     
The findings of this paper have important policy implications. The empirical results show that both the 
US aid and China’s aid have a significantly positive impact on their exports to Africa, while there is a 
lack of evidence for the positive impact of US aid on total trade and its imports from Africa, this may 
suggest that China can maintain the existing foreign aid policy as a catalyst for its exports within the 
South-South cooperation framework, which brings win-win collaboration for China and Africa. 
Nevertheless, China’s aid policy should be transformed and upgraded with its economic development. 
For the US, it might need to adjust its aid policy in Africa. Foreign aid mainly serves for its political 
and security interests, which might not a wise strategy in the context of an ever-increasing China’s 
presence in the African continent. With regard to the implications for aid recipients, African countries 
could make full use of the capital and technologies from donors to strengthen and advance their 
domestic economies, and then they would be less relied on foreign assistance, especially the 
conditional aid. Only when the future of African economies is largely dependent on their own 
strengths and resources can a fairer and more equal international economic order be established. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Var. Std.Dev Min Max Obs. 
Panel A: US 
lnTrade 20.517 3.110 1.763 16.864 24.492 259 
lnExport 19.307 2.418 1.555 12.326 22.745 260 
lnImport 19.646 5.710 2.390 13.450 24.392 259 
lnODA 3.486 5.644 2.376 -4.605 6.707 252 
lnGDP 10.673 0.013 0.115 10.129 10.843 260 
lnDIST 9.207 0.067 0.259 8.724 9.631 260 
FDI -0.054 0.900 0.949 -2.063 2.779 260 
Tfree 65.348 127.523 11.293 28.6 90 257 
GE -0.570 0.360 0.600 -1.72 0.93 260 
PS -0.368 0.675 0.822 -2.3 1.19 260 
RL -0.542 0.361 0.601 -1.53 1.06 260 
RQ -0.476 0.320 0.566 -1.66 0.98 260 
CC -0.561 0.350 0.591 -1.71 1.25 260 
VA -0.575 0.507 0.712 -1.94 0.9 260 
       
Panel B: China 
lnTrade 19.875 2.641 1.625 15.451 24.350 300 
lnExport 19.320 2.306 1.519 15.052 22.953 300 
lnImport 17.738 8.853 2.975 0 24.237 300 
lnODA 17.744 5.536 2.353 9.11 23.155 246 
lnGDP 7.571 0.911 0.955 0.910 9.899 300 
lnDIST 9.274 0.019 0.137 8.929 9.446 300 
FDI -0.020 0.913 0.956 -1.909 2.749 300 
Tfree 64.16 127.626 11.297 19 89 294 
GE -0.689 0.307 0.554 -1.72 0.93 300 
PS -0.488 0.684 0.827 -2.51 1.19 300 
RL -0.665 0.379 0.616 -1.84 1.06 300 
RQ -0.595 0.314 0.560 -2.21 0.98 300 
CC -0.628 0.325 0.570 -1.71 1.25 300 
VA -0.603 0.438 0.662 -1.9 0.9 300 
Notes:  
1. This table reports the summary of datasets used for the investigation of the aid-trade relationship between US/China and 
African economies over the period 2003-2012.  
2. Trade, Export, Import, aid (ODA), per capita GDP and distance (DIST) are expressed as log terms. Tfree indicates the 
freedom of trade. The last six variables (GE, PS, RL, RQ, CC, VA) in each panel are the World Bank’s worldwide 
Governance Indicators, see appendix Table A.2 for details.   
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Table 4: Aid and Bilateral Trade Relationship between the US and Africa 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects First-differenced GMM 
lnODA -0.014 -0.006 -0.002 -0.099 
 (0.057) (0.036) (0.036) (0.134) 
lnGDP -3.665*** 3.331*** 3.186*** 4.042** 
 (1.170) (0.447) (0.458) (2.027) 
lnDIST -0.611 
 
-1.969 
 
 (0.454) 
 
(1.255) 
 
FDI 0.139 0.037 0.037 -0.030 
 (0.106) (0.028) (0.029) (0.121) 
Tfree 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) 
CC -0.910** -0.047 -0.105 2.398 
 (0.443) (0.247) (0.251) (1.937) 
GE 3.116*** -0.600** -0.515** -0.272 
 (0.536) (0.253) (0.256) (1.548) 
PS -0.435** 0.401*** 0.377*** -0.041 
 (0.188) (0.107) (0.108) (0.861) 
RL -1.283*** 0.667** 0.580* -2.393 
 (0.494) (0.320) (0.318) (1.636) 
RQ -0.962** 0.096 0.058 2.821 
 (0.474) (0.208) (0.211) (1.828) 
VA -0.309 0.064 -0.026 -1.572 
 (0.333) (0.211) (0.211) (1.032) 
L.lnTrade  
  
-0.230 
  
  
(0.317) 
L2.lnTrade  
  
0.058 
  
  
(0.204) 
L.lnODA  
  
0.022 
  
  
(0.116) 
L.lnGDP  
  
1.756 
  
  
(1.795) 
L.FDI  
  
0.049 
  
  
(0.113) 
L2.FDI  
  
0.246** 
  
  
(0.100) 
Constant 64.788*** -14.877*** 4.737 
 
 (13.473) (4.599) (12.490) 
 
Hausman  115.123 
 
Hau_p  0.000 
 
Adj.R2 0.263 
   
R2 0.296 0.367 0.365 
 
AR1(p)  
  
0.987 
AR2(p)  
  
0.485 
Sargan(p)  
  
0.614 
Hansen(p)  
  
0.586 
Obs. 249 249 249 175 
Notes:  
1. Trade, aid (ODA), per capita GDP and distance (DIST) are expressed as log terms. Tfree indicates the freedom of trade. 
The last six variables (GE, PS, RL, RQ, CC, VA) in each panel are the World Bank’s worldwide Governance Indicators, see 
appendix Table A.2 for details.  
2. Hau_p means the p-value for the Hausman test. Adj.R2 indicates the adjusted R-square.  AR1(p) and AR2(p) indicate p-
values for the first and second order of the serial correlation test. The results show that there is no autocorrelation in first –
differenced errors. Sargan(p) and Hansen(p) are the p-value for the Sargan test and Hansen test, which are used for testing 
over-identifying restrictions. Sargan(p) and Hansen(p) indicate that overidentifying restrictions are valid. Obs. is the number 
of observations.  
3. In the first-differenced GMM model, trade (lnTrade), aid (lnODA), FDI, GDP (lnGDP) and their lags (determined by the 
general-to-specific approach) are endogenous variables. Distance (lnDIST), trade freedom (Tfree) and economic 
development level (Ecolevel) are treated as instrument variables. 
4. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Aid and US Exports to Africa 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects First-differenced GMM 
lnODA 0.173*** 0.058 0.070* 0.111 
 (0.045) (0.037) (0.037) (0.080) 
lnGDP -2.047** 4.023*** 3.858*** 2.466* 
 (0.925) (0.457) (0.467) (1.278) 
lnDIST -1.529*** 
 
-1.920** 
 
 (0.359) 
 
(0.951) 
 
FDI 0.130 0.052* 0.052* 0.107*** 
 (0.084) (0.029) (0.030) (0.039) 
Tfree 0.010 0.007* 0.006* -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
CC -1.427*** 0.091 -0.047 -0.045 
 (0.351) (0.252) (0.255) (0.617) 
GE 2.696*** -0.541** -0.327 0.388 
 (0.424) (0.258) (0.259) (0.675) 
PS -0.185 0.317*** 0.249** 0.004 
 (0.149) (0.110) (0.108) (0.413) 
RL -0.648* -0.094 -0.025 -0.275 
 (0.390) (0.327) (0.317) (1.297) 
RQ -0.269 0.189 0.197 2.286 
 (0.375) (0.212) (0.213) (1.600) 
VA -0.462* 0.012 -0.085 -1.021* 
 (0.263) (0.216) (0.211) (0.616) 
L.lnExport 
   
0.154 
 
   
(0.111) 
L2.lnExport 
   
-0.147 
 
   
(0.135) 
L.lnODA 
   
0.140 
 
   
(0.089) 
L.lnGDP 
   
2.015* 
 
   
(1.115) 
Constant 53.932*** -24.386*** -4.901 
 
 (10.655) (4.696) (10.022) 
 
Hausman 
 
0.567 
 
Hau_p 
 
1.000 
 
Adj.R2 0.346 
   
R2 0.375 0.475 0.472 
 
AR1(p) 
   
0.086 
AR2(p) 
   
0.333 
Sargan(p) 
   
0.222 
Hansen(p) 
   
0.634 
Obs. 249 249 249 175 
Notes:  
1. Export, aid (ODA), per capita GDP and distance (DIST) are expressed as log terms. Tfree indicates the freedom of trade. 
The last six variables (GE, PS, RL, RQ, CC, VA) in each panel are the World Bank’s worldwide Governance Indicators, see 
appendix Table A.2 for details.  
2.Hau_p means the p-value for the Hausman test. Adj.R2 indicates the adjusted R-square.  AR1(p) and AR2(p) indicate p-
values for the first and second order of the serial correlation test. The results show that there is no autocorrelation in first –
differenced errors. Sargan(p) and Hansen(p) are the p-value for the Sargan test and Hansen test, which are used for testing 
over-identifying restrictions. Sargan(p) and Hansen(p) indicate that overidentifying restrictions are valid. Obs. is the number 
of observations.  
3. Different from the other empirical results, random effects results are preferred here resulting from unobserved 
heterogeneity is not correlated with the regressors.  
4. In the first-differenced GMM model, export (lnExport), aid (lnODA), FDI, GDP (lnGDP) and their lags (determined by the 
general-to-specific approach) are endogenous variables. Distance (lnDIST), trade freedom (Tfree) and economic 
development level (Ecolevel) are treated as instrument variables. 
5. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 6: Aid and US Imports from Africa 
 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects First-differenced GMM 
lnODA -0.110 -0.036 -0.035 -0.108 
 (0.079) (0.057) (0.056) (0.142) 
lnGDP -5.841*** 2.661*** 2.459*** 2.090 
 (1.614) (0.705) (0.709) (1.929) 
lnDIST 1.187* 
 
-0.514 
 
 (0.626) 
 
(1.773) 
 
FDI 0.120 0.000 0.001 -0.075 
 (0.146) (0.045) (0.045) (0.117) 
Tfree 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
CC -1.063* -0.709* -0.769** -1.315 
 (0.612) (0.388) (0.388) (1.065) 
GE 4.139*** -0.306 -0.182 -1.205 
 (0.739) (0.398) (0.396) (2.013) 
PS -0.625** 0.455*** 0.423** -0.153 
 (0.260) (0.169) (0.166) (0.583) 
RL -1.788*** 0.788 0.669 3.064 
 (0.681) (0.504) (0.490) (2.178) 
RQ -1.430** 0.189 0.123 3.169* 
 (0.654) (0.327) (0.326) (1.915) 
VA -0.420 -0.047 -0.169 -1.678** 
 (0.459) (0.333) (0.326) (0.836) 
L.lnImport 
   
-0.250** 
 
   
(0.127) 
L2.lnImport 
   
-0.035 
 
   
(0.139) 
L.lnODA 
   
-0.044 
 
   
(0.165) 
L.lnGDP 
   
3.926** 
 
   
(1.945) 
L2.lnGDP 
   
-2.704* 
 
   
(1.479) 
L.FDI 
   
0.091 
 
   
(0.085) 
Constant 70.613*** -8.706 -1.907 
 
 (18.594) (7.245) (17.910) 
 
Hausman 
 
26.880 
 
Hau_p 
 
0.003 
 
Adj.R2 0.243 
   
R2 0.276 0.161 0.159 
 
AR1(p) 
   
0.170 
AR2(p) 
   
0.694 
Sargan(p) 
   
0.193 
Hansen(p) 
   
0.714 
Obs. 249 249 249 175 
Notes:  
1. Import, aid (ODA), per capita GDP and distance (DIST) are expressed as log terms. Tfree indicates the freedom of trade. 
The last six variables (GE, PS, RL, RQ, CC, VA) in each panel are the World Bank’s worldwide Governance Indicators, see 
appendix Table A.2 for details.  
2. Hau_p means the p-value for the Hausman test. Adj.R2 indicates the adjusted R-square.  AR1(p) and AR2(p) indicate p-
values for the first and second order of the serial correlation test. The results show that there is no autocorrelation in first –
differenced errors. Sargan(p) and Hansen(p) are the p-value for the Sargan test and Hansen test, which are used for testing 
over-identifying restrictions. Sargan(p) and Hansen(p) indicate that overidentifying restrictions are valid. Obs. is the number 
of observations.  
3. In the first-differenced GMM model, import (lnImport), aid (lnODA), FDI, GDP (lnGDP) and their lags (determined by 
the general-to-specific approach) are endogenous variables. Distance (lnDIST), trade freedom (Tfree) and economic 
development level (Ecolevel) are treated as instrument variables. 
4. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 7: Aid and Bilateral Trade Relationship between China and Africa 
 
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects First-differenced GMM 
lnODA 0.290*** 0.037** 0.062*** -0.040** 
 
(0.035) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
lnGDP -0.557*** 0.134*** 0.053 0.255*** 
 
(0.088) (0.050) (0.057) (0.049) 
lnDIST -0.269 
 
-0.346 
 
 
(0.730) 
 
(1.155) 
 
FDI 0.654*** 0.477*** 0.495*** 0.053 
 
(0.094) (0.041) (0.048) (0.053) 
Tfree 0.003 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.000 
 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
CC -1.013** 0.628** 0.212 0.022 
 
(0.347) (0.263) (0.282) (0.223) 
GE -0.393 -0.488* -0.410 0.437 
 
(0.393) (0.277) (0.305) (0.349) 
PS 0.309** 0.149 0.170 0.027 
 
(0.142) (0.114) (0.119) (0.243) 
RL 0.154 0.055 0.026 -0.760 
 
(0.427) (0.349) (0.360) (0.496) 
RQ 1.197*** -0.297 0.027 0.959 
 
(0.339) (0.295) (0.297) (0.811) 
VA -0.621*** -0.762*** -0.731*** -1.974*** 
 
(0.232) (0.260) (0.235) (0.665) 
L.lnTrade  
  
0.354*** 
 
 
  
(0.092) 
L2.lnTrade  
  
-0.164*** 
 
 
  
(0.060) 
L.lnODA  
  
0.061*** 
 
 
  
(0.016) 
L.FDI  
  
0.244** 
 
 
  
(0.100) 
Constant 21.118*** 16.423*** 19.796* 
 
 
(6.751) (0.527) (10.704) 
 
Hausman  58.490 
 
Hau_p  0.000 
 
Adj.R2 0.463 
   
R2 0.487 0.732 0.722 
 
AR1(p)  
  
0.031 
AR2(p)  
  
0.661 
Sargan(p)  
  
0.245 
Hansen(p)  
  
0.993 
Obs. 241 241 241 136 
Notes:  
1. Trade, aid (ODA), per capita GDP and distance (DIST) are expressed as log terms. Tfree indicates the freedom of trade. 
The last six variables (GE, PS, RL, RQ, CC, VA) in each panel are the World Bank’s worldwide Governance Indicators, see 
appendix Table A.2 for details.  
2. Hau_p means the p-value for the Hausman test. Adj.R2 indicates the adjusted R-square.  AR1(p) and AR2(p) indicate p-
values for the first and second order of the serial correlation test. The results show that there is no autocorrelation in first –
differenced errors. Sargan(p) and Hansen(p) are the p-value for the Sargan test and Hansen test, which are used for testing 
over-identifying restrictions. Sargan(p) and Hansen(p) indicate that overidentifying restrictions are valid. Obs. is the number 
of observations.  
3. In the first-differenced GMM model, trade (lnTrade), aid (lnODA), FDI, GDP (lnGDP) and their lags (determined by the 
general-to-specific approach) are endogenous variables. Distance (lnDIST), trade freedom (Tfree) and economic 
development level (Ecolevel) are treated as instrument variables. 
4. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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  Table 8: Aid and China’s Exports to Africa 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects First-differenced GMM 
lnODA 0.258*** 0.050*** 0.063*** 0.047 
 (0.035) (0.017) (0.019) (0.031) 
lnGDP -0.285*** 0.194*** 0.156*** 0.103 
 (0.087) (0.052) (0.056) (0.084) 
lnDIST -1.357* 
 
-1.694 
 
 (0.724) 
 
(1.282) 
 
FDI 0.597*** 0.434*** 0.447*** 0.001 
 (0.093) (0.043) (0.047) (0.035) 
Tfree -0.003 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
CC -0.449 0.614** 0.310 -0.372 
 (0.344) (0.274) (0.281) (0.466) 
GE -0.657* -0.637** -0.571* 1.236** 
 (0.390) (0.288) (0.302) (0.489) 
PS -0.288** 0.279** 0.144 0.249 
 (0.141) (0.118) (0.119) (0.353) 
RL 0.154 0.335 0.339 0.112 
 (0.423) (0.363) (0.359) (0.409) 
RQ 1.291*** -0.315 0.075 1.344* 
 (0.336) (0.307) (0.297) (0.792) 
VA 0.034 -0.965*** -0.625*** -1.239* 
 (0.230) (0.271) (0.239) (0.741) 
L.lnExport 
   
0.485*** 
 
   
(0.112) 
L2.lnExport 
   
-0.374*** 
 
   
(0.099) 
L3.lnExport 
   
0.230** 
 
   
(0.104) 
L.lnODA 
   
0.072** 
 
   
(0.028) 
L.FDIS 
   
0.252*** 
 
   
(0.071) 
Constant 29.871*** 15.155*** 31.194*** 
 
 (6.692) (0.549) (11.883) 
 
Hausman 
 
109.234 
 
Hau_p 
 
0.000 
 
Adj.R2 0.395 
   
R2 0.423 0.729 0.721 
 
AR1(p) 
   
0.065 
AR2(p) 
   
0.263 
Sargan(p) 
   
0.209 
Hansen(p) 
   
1.000 
Obs. 241 241 241 123 
Notes:  
1. Export, aid (ODA), per capita GDP and distance (DIST) are expressed as log terms. Tfree indicates the freedom of trade. 
The last six variables (GE, PS, RL, RQ, CC, VA) in each panel are the World Bank’s worldwide Governance Indicators, see 
appendix Table A.2 for details. 
2. Hau_p means the p-value for the Hausman test. Adj.R2 indicates the adjusted R-square.  AR1(p) and AR2(p) indicate p-
values for the first and second order of the serial correlation test. The results show that there is no autocorrelation in first –
differenced errors. Sargan(p) and Hansen(p) are the p-value for the Sargan test and Hansen test, which are used for testing 
over-identifying restrictions. Sargan(p) and Hansen(p) indicate that overidentifying restrictions are valid. Obs. is the number 
of observations.  
3. In the first-differenced GMM model, export (lnExport), aid (lnODA), FDI, GDP (lnGDP) and their lags (determined by the 
general-to-specific approach) are endogenous variables. Distance (lnDIST), trade freedom (Tfree), World Bank’s worldwide 
Governance Indicators (GE, PS, RL, RQ, CC, VA) and economic development level (Ecolevel) are treated as instrument 
variables. 
4. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 9: Aid and China’s Imports from Africa 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects First-differenced GMM 
lnODA 0.468*** 0.034 0.129** -0.004 
 (0.070) (0.050) (0.053) (0.020) 
lnGDP -0.910*** 0.190 -0.092 0.184*** 
 (0.177) (0.154) (0.159) (0.063) 
lnDIST 3.357** 
 
4.517** 
 
 (1.464) 
 
(2.280) 
 
FDI 0.755*** 0.571*** 0.627*** -0.053 
 (0.189) (0.125) (0.135) (0.065) 
Tfree 0.050*** 0.040*** 0.043*** -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) 
CC -1.099 0.459 -0.211 -0.534 
 (0.695) (0.802) (0.740) (1.091) 
GE 0.869 -0.852 -0.076 -0.286 
 (0.788) (0.845) (0.813) (0.526) 
PS 0.823*** -0.422 0.046 -0.107 
 (0.285) (0.347) (0.312) (0.210) 
RL 0.651 1.593 1.225 -0.310 
 (0.855) (1.064) (0.944) (1.068) 
RQ -0.357 -0.505 -0.565 -0.366 
 (0.680) (0.899) (0.772) (0.921) 
VA -1.859*** -1.222 -1.797*** -0.595 
 (0.464) (0.794) (0.582) (0.844) 
L.lnImport 
   
0.184*** 
 
   
(0.068) 
L2.lnImport 
   
-0.099 
 
   
(0.091) 
L.lnODA 
   
0.065*** 
 
   
(0.019) 
L.lnGDP 
   
0.184** 
 
   
(0.075) 
L.FDIS 
   
0.463** 
 
   
(0.182) 
Constant -18.361 12.870*** -29.160 
 
 (13.533) (1.608) (21.127) 
 
Hausman 
 
706.629 
 
Hau_p 
 
0.000 
 
Adj.R2 0.385 
   
R2 0.413 0.347 0.322 
 
AR1(p) 
   
0.150 
AR2(p) 
   
0.647 
Sargan(p) 
   
0.422 
Hansen(p) 
   
0.719 
Obs. 241 241 241 136 
Notes:  
1. Import, aid (ODA), per capita GDP and distance (DIST) are expressed as log terms. Tfree indicates the freedom of trade. 
The last six variables (GE, PS, RL, RQ, CC, VA) in each panel are the World Bank’s worldwide Governance Indicators, see 
appendix Table A.2 for details.  
2. Hau_p means the p-value for the Hausman test. Adj.R2 indicates the adjusted R-square.  AR1(p) and AR2(p) indicate p-
values for the first and second order of the serial correlation test. The results show that there is no autocorrelation in first –
differenced errors. Sargan(p) and Hansen(p) are the p-value for the Sargan test and Hansen test, which are used for testing 
over-identifying restrictions. Sargan(p) and Hansen(p) indicate that overidentifying restrictions are valid. Obs. is the number 
of observations.  
3. In the first-differenced GMM model, import (lnImport), aid (lnODA), FDI, GDP (lnGDP) and their lags (determined by 
the general-to-specific approach) are endogenous variables. Distance (lnDIST), trade freedom (Tfree), World Bank’s 
worldwide Governance Indicators (GE, PS, RL, RQ, CC, VA) and economic development level (Ecolevel) are treated as 
instrument variables. 
4. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Appendix  
Table A. 1: US top 10 Largest Trading Partners and Aid Recipients in Africa (2012) (Million USD) 
 Aid Recipient Value Total Trade Value Importer Value Exporter Value 
1 Kenya 818.26 Nigeria 24.44 South Africa 7.55 Nigeria 19.41 
2 Ethiopia 693.4 South Africa 16.38 Egypt 5.50 Algeria 10.20 
3 Tanzania 561.78 Algeria 11.56 Nigeria 5.03 Angola 10.03 
4 South Africa 504.06 Angola 11.52 Morocco 2.17 South Africa 8.83 
5 Sudan 454.33 Egypt 8.61 Angola 1.49 Egypt 3.11 
6 Nigeria 414.95 Morocco 3.16 Algeria 1.36 Chad 2.71 
7 Mozambique 412.56 Libya 3.10 Ghana 1.32 Libya 2.55 
8 South Sudan 382.02 Chad 2.75 Ethiopia 1.27 Gabon 1.93 
9 Uganda 380.82 Gabon 2.25 Tunisia 0.61 Equatorial Guinea 1.75 
10 Mali 342.27 Equatorial Guinea 1.98 Benin 0.57 Congo 1.51 
Source: UN Comtrade and OECD. 
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 Table A.2: Variable Definition and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Data Source and Link 
Trade Total trade between US/China 
and African countries 
United Nations Comtrade Statistics Database 
https://comtrade.un.org/data/. 
Export US/China’s exports to African 
countries 
United Nations Comtrade Statistics Database 
https://comtrade.un.org/data/. 
Import US/China’s exports from 
African countries 
United Nations Comtrade Statistics Database 
https://comtrade.un.org/data/. 
ODA US/China’s aid to African 
countries 
OECD statistics/ AidData 
http://stats.oecd.org/ and http://china.aiddata.org/ 
FDI US/China’s FDI stock to 
African countries 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development/Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment  
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-
Statistics-Bilateral.aspx. 
GDP Difference of per capita GDP 
between US/China and African 
countries 
World Development Indicators Online database 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-
development-indicators 
DIST Geographical distance between 
capital cities 
CEPII database 
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp 
Tfree Trade freedom Heritage Foundation   
http://www.heritage.org. 
GE Government effectiveness World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-
indicators (hereafter the same) 
PS Political stability and absence 
of violence 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
RL Rule of law World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
RQ Regulatory quality World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
CC Control of corruption World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
VA Voice and accountability World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Ecolevel Economic development level World Development Report 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
